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Abstract
We deﬁne a new solution concept for an undiscounted dynamic game - a perfect uni-
form normal-form constant-expectation correlated approximate equilibrium with a
canonical and universal correlation device. This equilibrium has the following appeal-
ing properties: (1) Trembling-hand perfectness - players do not use non-credible
threats; (2) Uniformness - it is an approximate equilibrium in any long enough ﬁnite-
horizon game and in any discounted game with a high enough discount factor; (3)
Normal-form correlation - The strategy of a player depends on a private signal he
receives before the game starts (which can be induced by cheap-talk among the
players); (4) Constant expectation - The expected payoﬀ of each player almost does
not change when he receives his signal; (5) Universal correlation device - the device
does not depend on the speciﬁc parameters of the game. (6) Canonical - each signal
is equivalent to a strategy. We demonstrate the use of this equilibrium by proving
its existence in every undiscounted multi-player stopping game.
Key words: Keywords: stochastic games, stopping games, perfect correlated
equilibrium, distribution equilibrium, Ramsey Theorem. JEL classiﬁcation: C73
1 Introduction
Consider the following example of strategic interaction in the ﬁnancial mar-
kets:
1 This work is in partial fulﬁllment of the requirements for the Ph.D. in mathematics
at Tel-Aviv University. I would like to thank Eilon Solan for his careful supervision,
for the continuous help he oﬀered, and for many insightful discussions.
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Example 1 The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes each month a news re-
lease on U.S. employment situation (ES). This news release is announced
in the middle of the trading day in the European stock markets. 2 The ES
announcement has strong impact on these markets (see Nikkinen et al. [25]
and the references within). Empirical studies (see for example, Christie-David,
Chaudhry and Khan [6]) show that a few dozen minutes elapse before ﬁnancial
instruments adjust to such announcements. This gap of time (the adjustment
period) may provide an opportunity for substantial proﬁt by quick trading
(news-playing). Consider the strategic interaction between a few traders of a
ﬁnancial institution that coordinate their trading actions in the adjustment pe-
riod. Each trader is responsible for some ﬁnancial instruments, and can make
buy and sell orders for these instruments during the adjustment period. The
traders share a common objective - maximizing the proﬁt of the institution.
In addition to this, each trader has also a private objective - maximizing the
proﬁt that is made in ﬁnancial instruments that are under his responsibility
(which inﬂuence his bonuses and prestige).
Three natural questions arise when modeling the strategic interaction among
the traders in this example: (1) Which kind of game should be used? (2) Which
solution concept should be chosen? (3) Is it possible to prove the existence of
this solution in this game? which simplifying assumptions are needed?
We begin by dealing with the ﬁrst question. The adjustment period is relatively
short in absolute terms - a few dozen minutes. Nevertheless, the traders have
many opportunities to act, as they can make diﬀerent orders in each fraction of
a second. In addition, the point in time where the markets have fully adjusted
may not be known to the players in real-time. Thus, it seems more appropriate
to model this situation as a stochastic (dynamic) game with inﬁnite-horizon,
rather then modeling it as a game with a ﬁxed ﬁnite large number of stages (see
Rubinstein [30, Sect. 5], for a discussion why even short strategic interactions
may be better analyzed as inﬁnite-horizon games).
Each buy order induces a single-stage proﬁt (or loss) that depends on the
diﬀerence between the value of the bought amount at the buying time and at
the end of the adjustment period, and similarly for sell orders. The total payoﬀ
of each trader depends on his own proﬁt (the sum of his single-stage proﬁts)
and on the proﬁt of all the traders in the company. As all proﬁts and losses
are accumulated in the same day, it is natural to assume that these sums are
undiscounted : there is no diﬀerence between earning a dollar at early or late
stages of the game.
Due to the above arguments we model the interaction in example 1 as an
undiscounted inﬁnite-horizon stochastic game. We now deal with the second
2 It is published on the ﬁrst Friday of each month at 13:30 London time (8:30
Eastern Time).
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question: which solution concept is appropriate for this game. In order to
avoid the use of equilibria that rely on non-credible threats of punishment, we
require the solution concept to satisfy the standard requirement of trembling-
hand perfection (Selten, [31]). 3
Aumann ([1]) deﬁned the concept of correlated equilibrium in a ﬁnite normal-
form game as a Nash equilibrium in an extended game that includes a corre-
lation device, which sends a private signal to each player before the start of
play. The strategy of each player can then depend on the private signal that
he received. 4 It is well known that a correlation device can be induced by
pre-play non-biding communication among the players (cheap-talk). 5
For sequential games, two main versions of correlated equilibrium have been
studied (see e.g., Forges [10]): normal-form correlated equilibrium, where each
player receives a private signal only before the game starts, and extensive-form
correlated equilibrium, where each player receives a private signal at each stage
of the game. In example 1, the traders can freely communicate and coordinate
their future actions before the play starts (that is, before the adjustment period
begins). On the other hand, communication and coordination along the play
are very costly: the adjustment period is short (a few dozen minutes), and
each moment that is spent on communication may slow down the traders and
limit their potential proﬁts. Thus, the smaller set of normal-form correlated
equilibria is more appropriate to example 1. 6
The above arguments limit the plausible outcomes of the game to the set of
perfect normal-form correlated equilibria. A few papers deﬁned and studied
the properties of perfect correlated equilibria in ﬁnite games, see e.g., Myerson
([20,21]) and Dhillon and Mertens ([7]). As inﬁnite undiscounted games may
only admit approximate equilibria, we generalize the deﬁnition of the last
3 In the rest of this paper we use the shorter term perfection to denote trembling-
hand perfection.
4 Correlated equilibria in ﬁnite games have a number of appealing properties. They
are computationally tractable. Existence is veriﬁed by checking a system of linear
inequalities rather than a ﬁxed point. The set of correlated equilibria is closed and
convex. Aumann ([2]) argues that it is the solution concept consistent with the
Bayesian perspective on decision making.
5 Ben-Porath ([4]) shows that if there are at least three players and if there are two
distinct Nash equilibrium payoﬀs for each player, then each correlated equilibrium
distribution can be implemented as a perfect Nash equilibrium of an extended game
with pre-play cheap-talk. Urbano and Villa ([38]) demonstrate the use of crypto-
graphic methods to achieve similar implementation when there are only two players.
Heller ([14]) shows that the implementation can be done in way that is also resistant
to joint deviations of coalitions.
6 Note that every normal-form correlated equilibrium is an extensive-form correlated
equilibrium, but the converse is not true.
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paper, and deﬁne a perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium, as a strategy proﬁle
where with probability of at-least 1 − δ, no player can earn more than  by
deviating at any stage of the game and after any history of play (as formally
deﬁned in Section 2).
We further impose four more requirements from the solution concept:
• Uniformness - An equilibrium of an undiscounted game is uniform if it is an
approximate equilibrium in any long enough ﬁnite-horizon stopping game
and in any discounted stopping game with a high enough discount factor. 7
• Canonical correlation device - each signal is equivalent to a strategy.
• Universal correlation device - The correlation device does not depend on
the speciﬁc payoﬀ functions of the players (it only depends on the number
of players and on ). This property allows the traders to use the same
correlation device for all news-playing interactions, rather than devising a
new correlation device each time.
• Approximate constant-expectation equilibrium - Sorin ([37]) deﬁnes a distri-
bution equilibrium in a normal-form ﬁnite game, as a correlated equilibrium
where the expected payoﬀ of each player is independent of his signal. With-
out this property the implementation of a correlated equilibrium by pre-play
communication is much more complex: a trader who receives a bad signal
that induces a low payoﬀ, may not cooperate in the rest of the communica-
tion, and this may interfere with the construction of the correlated proﬁle.
We generalize Sorin's deﬁnition and deﬁne a (δ, )-constant-expectation cor-
related equilibrium, as a correlated equilibrium where the expected payoﬀ
of a player almost does not change when he receives his signal.
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is the presentation of this new solu-
tion concept for undiscounted dynamic games: a perfect uniform normal-form
constant-expectation correlated approximate equilibrium with a canonical and
universal correlation device. Our second contribution is demonstrating its use
in a speciﬁc family of dynamic games (stopping games, described below). We
hope that this concept will be useful in future study of other dynamic games. 8
We now deal with the third question: proving the existence of this equilibrium.
We prove it under two simplifying assumptions on the strategic interaction.
Each trader in example 1 may act several times during the adjustment phase.
Speciﬁcally, for each ﬁnancial instrument under his responsibility, the trader
chooses a stage to buy and a stage to sell. Our ﬁrst simplifying assumption
assumes that each trader only acts once: he chooses a single stage in the
entire game where he stops - makes a single buy or sell order. The second
7 See Aumann and Mashcler ([3]) for arguments in favor of this notion.
8 Our deﬁnition is analog to the notion of sub-game perfect (δ, )-equilibrium pre-
sented in Mashiah-Yaakovi ([17]), where it is proven that such equilibrium exists in
multi-player stopping games where at any stage a single player is allowed to stop.
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simplifying assumption requires that throughout the game, the traders have
symmetric information on the ﬁnancial markets (such as past prices of the
diﬀerent markets).
Our model of the strategic interaction and the solution concept, are also ap-
propriate in other situations, as demonstrated in the following examples.
Example 2 A few countries plan to ally together in a war against another
country. The allying countries share a common objective - maximizing the mil-
itary success against the common enemy. In addition to this, each country has
private objectives, such as maximizing the territories and resources it occupies
during the war, and minimizing its losses.
Example 3 A few male animals compete over the relative positions they shall
occupy in the social hierarchy or pack order. This competition is often settled by
a war of attrition (Maynard Smith, [18]). In such a contest the animals use
ritualized ﬁghting and do not seriously injure the opponents. The winner is
the contestant who continues the war for the longest time. Excessive persistence
has the disadvantages of waste of time and energy in the contest.
Examples 2 and 3 share similar properties to example 1. These similarities
make our model and solution concept appropriate to these examples as well:
• In both examples, the war is relatively short in absolute time (a modern
war typically lasts a couple of weeks; a war of attrition usually lasts a few
hours or days). Nevertheless its length is not bounded, and it consists a
large unknown number of stages. Thus, it seems appropriate to model these
situations as undiscounted inﬁnite-horizon stochastic games.
• Normal-form correlation is appropriate to both examples. The country Rep-
resentatives in example 2 can communicate and coordinate their future ac-
tions before the war begins. On the other hand, secure communication and
coordination during the war is costly and noisy. Shmida and Peleg ([33])
discuss how a normal-form (but not extensive-form) correlation device can
be induced in nature by phenotypic conditional behavior. 9
• Each country in example 2 does many actions in the battleﬁeld, but usually
only a few of them are crucial to the outcome of the war. A simplifying
model may concentrate on the most important action of each country, such
as the timing of the main military attack. The only choice of strategy of
each animal in example 3, is the maximal period for which he is prepared to
continue in the contest (and this period may depend on the set of animals
9 They present an example ([33, Section 5]) of butterﬂies who compete for sunspot
clearings in a forest in order to fertilize females. When two butterﬂies meet in a
sunspot, they engage in a war of attrition. The period of time each butterﬂy was in
the spot before the ﬁghting, is used as a normal-form correlation device: a senior
butterﬂy stays for a long time in the war, while a new butterﬂy gives up early.
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who are still competing).
• The constant-expectation requirement deﬁned earlier is specially appeal-
ing in a biological setup as in example 3. As discussed in [37], constant-
expectation is a necessary requirement for the stability of the population in
evolutionary setups. 10
Under the two simplifying assumptions mentioned earlier, the strategic inter-
action is a stopping game. An undiscounted discrete stopping game is played
by a ﬁnite set of players. There is an unknown state variable, on which play-
ers receive symmetric partial information along the game. At stage 1 all the
players are active. At every stage n, each active player declares, independently
of the others, whether he stops or continues. A player that stops at stage n,
becomes passive for the rest of the game. The payoﬀ of a player depends on
the history of actions while he has been active and on the state variable.
Stopping games have been introduced by Dynkin ([8]) as a generalization of
optimal stopping problems, and later used in several models in economics,
management science, political science and biology, such as research and de-
velopment (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [11] and Mamer [16]), struggle of
survival among ﬁrms in a declining market (see e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole
[12], Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ [13], and Fine and Li [9]), auctions (see e.g.,
Krishna and Morgan [15]), lobbying (see e.g., Bulow and Klemperer [5]), and
conﬂict among animals (see e.g., Nalebuﬀ and Riley [22]).
Much work has been devoted to the study of undiscounted 2-player stopping
games. This problem, when the payoﬀs have a special structure, was stud-
ied, among others, by Neveu ([24]), Mamer ([16]), Morimoto ([19]), Ohtsubo
([27]), Nowak and Szajowski ([26]), Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille ([29]), and
Neumann, Ramsey and Szajowski ([23]). Those authors provided various suﬃ-
cient conditions under which (Nash) -equilibria exist. Recently, Shmaya and
Solan ([32]) have proved the existence of (Nash) -equilibria assuming only
integrability of the payoﬀs. In contrast with the 2-player case, there is no
existence result for -equilibria in multi-player stopping games.
Our main result shows that for every δ,  > 0, a multi-player stopping game ad-
mits a perfect normal-form constant-expectation correlated (δ, )-equilibrium
with a canonical and universal correlation device. The proof relies on using
stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem ([32]) to reduce the problem to that
10 This is demonstrated in [37, example 1]. Consider a symmetric two-player game
where the payoﬀ (ﬁtness) is 1 if both players play A, 2 if both play B and 0 otherwise.
Consider a correlated equilibrium in some population: half of the population are type
A - they always play against other A-s and they play action A; the other half are type
B- they always play against other B-s and they play action B. This equilibrium does
not satisfy the constane-expectation property, and it is not atable in an evolutionary
setup: type B gets a higher ﬁtness and they would invade the whole population.
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of studying the properties of correlated -equilibria in multi-player absorbing
games. 11 The study uses the result of Solan and Vohra [36] that any multi-
player absorbing game admits a correlated -equilibrium.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the result.
A sketch of the proof appears in Section 3. In Section 4 we reduce the problem
to induced games deep enough in the tree. Section 5 studies games played on
ﬁnite trees. In Section 6 we use the stochastic variation of Ramsey's theorem,
which allows us to construct a perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in Section
7. The formal model in Sections 2-7 deals only with stopping games that
terminate as soon as any of the players stop. In Section 8 we discuss how to
apply our result for more general stopping games.
2 Model and Main Result
Deﬁnition 4 A stopping game is a 6-tuple G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) where:
• I is a ﬁnite set of players;
• (Ω,A, p) is a probability space;
• F = (Fn)n≥0 is a ﬁltration over (Ω,A, p);
• R = (Rn)n≥0 is an F -adapted R|I|·(2
|I|−1)-valued process. The coordinates
of Rn are denoted by R
i
S,nwhere i ∈ I and ∅ 6= S ⊆ N .
A stopping game is played as follows. At each stage n, each player is informed
which elements of Fn include ω (the state of the world), and declares, indepen-
dently of the others, whether he stops or continues. If all players continue, the
game continues to the next stage. If at-least one player stops, say a coalition
S ⊆ I, the game terminates, and the payoﬀ to player i is RiS,n. If no player
ever stops, the payoﬀ to everyone is zero.
Remark 5 Deﬁnition 4 describes games that end as soon as one of the players
stop. In Section 8 we discuss how to extend our results to more generalized
stopping games where a player that stops gets his payoﬀ and becomes passive
for the rest of the game, and the game continues with the other players.
Deﬁnition 6 deﬁnes a correlation device:
Deﬁnition 6 A (normal-form) correlation device is a pair D = (M,µ): (1)
M = (M i)i∈I , where M
i is a ﬁnite space of signals the device can send player
i, and (2) µ ∈ 4 (M) is the probability distribution according to which the
device sends the signals to the players before the stopping game starts.
11An absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single non-absorbing state.
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Given a correlation device D, we deﬁne an extended game G (D). The game
G (D) is played exactly as G, except that before the game starts, a signal
combinationm = (mi)i∈I is drawn according to µ, and each player i is privately
informed of mi. Then, each player may base his strategy on his signal.
For simplicity of notation, let the singleton coalition {i} be denoted as i,
and let −i = {I\i} denote the coalition of all the players besides player i. A
(behavioral) strategy for player i ∈ I in G (D) is an F -adapted process xi =
(xin)n≥0, where x
i
n : (Ω×M i) → [0, 1]. The interpretation is that xin (ω,mi)
is the probability by which player i stops at stage n when he has received
a signal mi. A strategy proﬁle x = (xi)i∈I is completely mixed if at each
stage, given any signal, each player has a positive probability to stop and a
positive probability to continue. Formally: for each i ∈ I, mi ∈ M i, n ∈ N:
0 < xin (ω,m
i) < 1.
Consider a function that assigns a correlation device to each stopping game,
given some positive values of δ and . We say that the assigned correlation
device is universal if it depends only on the number of players and .
Deﬁnition 7 Let f be a function that assigns to each stopping game G and
to each , δ > 0 a correlation device f(G, , δ) = D(G, , δ). The function f
is universal if the assigned correlation device depends only on the number
of players and : D(G, , δ) = D(|I| , ). Given such a function, we call the
assigned device a universal correlation device.
A correlation device D = (M,µ) is canonical if each signal mi ∈M i is equiv-
alent to a strategy of player i.
Deﬁnition 8 Let G be a stopping game. A correlation device D = (M,µ) is
canonical given the strategy proﬁle x in G (D) if , for each player i there is an
injection between M i and his set of strategies in G. That is x (mi) 6= x (m′i)
for each mi 6= m′i. 12
Let θi be the stage in which player i stops and let θi = ∞ if player i never
stops. If θi < ∞ let Sθi ⊆ I be the coalition that stops at stage θi, and if
θi = ∞ let Sθi ⊆ I be the coalition of players who never stops in the game.
The expected payoﬀ of player i under the strategy proﬁle x = (xi)i∈I is given
by γi (x) = Ex
(
RiSθi ,θi
)
where the expectation Ex is with respect to (w.r.t.)
the distribution Px over plays induced by x. Given an event E ⊆ Ω, let γi (x|E)
be the expected payoﬀ conditioned on E: γi (x|E) = Ex
(
RiS,θi |E
)
, and let it
arbitrarily equal to 0 when p (E) = 0.
12 The standard deﬁnition of canonical correlation device for ﬁnite games, is that
the set of signals is equal to the set of strategy proﬁles. Our deﬁnition is somewhat
diﬀerent because the set of signals is ﬁnite, while the set of strategies is inﬁnite.
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Given a correlation device D and δ,  > 0, we say that a proﬁle x has (δ, )-
constant-expectation if with high probability the expected payoﬀ of a player
almost does not change when he obtains his signal. 13
Deﬁnition 9 Let G be a stopping game, , δ > 0, D = (M,µ) a correlation
device. The strategy proﬁle x in G(D) is (δ, )-constant-expectation if there
is a set M ′ ⊆ M satisfying µ(M ′) > 1 − δ, such that for every player i ∈ I
and every signal mi ∈ (M ′)i: |γi(x|mi)− γi(x)| ≤ , where γi(x|mi) is the
expected payoﬀ of player i where all players follow x, conditioned on that
player i received a signal mi.
The strategy xi is -best reply for player i when all his opponents follow x−i if
for every strategy yi of player i: γi (x) ≥ γi (x−i, yi)− . Similarly, xi is -best
reply conditioned on E if γi (x |E ) ≥ γi (x−i , y i |E )− .
Given ω ∈ Ω let Hn (ω) ⊆ Fn be the elements Fn that include ω: Hn (ω) =
{Fn ∈ Fn|ω ∈ Fn}, and let Hn the set of all such sets: Hn = {Hn (ω) |ω ∈ Ω}.
Let G(Hn,D) be the induced stopping game that begins at stage n, when the
players are informed of Hn ∈ Hn (i.e, they are informed that the elements of
Fn that include ω are the elements of Hn). For simplicity of notation, we use
the same notation for a strategy proﬁle in G (D) and for the induced strategy
proﬁle in G(Hn,D). We now deﬁne a few auxiliary deﬁnitions that are used
to deﬁne a perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium. The deﬁnition extends [7]'s
deﬁnition of perfect correlated equilibrium in normal-form ﬁnite games.
Deﬁnition 10 Let G (D) be a stopping game, let E ⊆ Ω be an event, let
M ′ ⊆M be a set of signal proﬁles, and let  > 0. A strategy proﬁle x = (xi)i∈I
is a perfect -equilibrium of G (D) conditioned on E and given M ′, if there
exists a sequence (yk)k∈N=(y
i
k)k∈N,i∈I of completely mixed strategy proﬁles in
G (D), and a sequence (k)k∈N (0 < k < 1) converging to 0, such that for all
i ∈ I, n ∈ N, Hn ∈ Hn, xi is -best reply for player i ∈ I in the induced game
G(Hn,D) when all his opponents j ∈ −i use (1− k)xj + kyjk, conditioned on
E and given that the signal proﬁle is included in M ′.
That is, x is a perfect -equilibrium conditioned on E and given M ′, if it is a
limit of completely mixed proﬁles yk, such that for each player i, x
i is is -best
reply for y−ik whenever the state ω is in E and the signal proﬁle is in M
′.
Remark 11 In the setup of stopping games, the history up to stage n only
includes the symmetric information on ω, which is given by Hn ∈ Hn. In a
more general stochastic game, Def. 10 would remain the same, except that Hn
should be modiﬁed to denote the set of all possible histories of length n.
13 This generalizes [37]'s deﬁnition of distribution equilibrium for ﬁnite normal-form
games, which was discussed in Section 1.
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A proﬁle is a perfect (δ, )-equilibrium if it is an -equilibrium conditioned on
E and given M ′, where E and M ′ have probabilities of at least 1− δ.
Deﬁnition 12 Let G (D) be a stopping game and let δ,  > 0. A proﬁle
x = (xi)i∈I is a perfect (δ, )-equilibrium of G (D) if there exists an event E ⊆ Ω
and a set of signal proﬁles M ′ ⊆ M , such that p(E) > 1− δ, µ(M ′) > 1− δ,
and x is a perfect -equilibrium of G (D) conditioned on E and given M ′.
Finally, we deﬁne a perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 13 Let G be a stopping game and let δ,  > 0. A perfect correlated
(δ, )-equilibrium is a pair (D, x) where D is a correlation device and x is a
perfect (δ, )-equilibrium in the extended game G (D).
Our main Result is the following:
Theorem 14 Let δ,  > 0 and let G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) be a multi-player
stopping game such that supn∈(N
⋃
∞) ‖Rn‖∞ ∈ L1(p) (integrable payoﬀs).
Then for every δ,  > 0,G has a perfect normal-form (δ, )-constant-expectation
correlated (δ, )-equilibrium with a canonical and universal correlation device.
Remark 15 The perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium that we construct is uni-
form in a strong sense: it is a (δ, 3)-equilibrium in every ﬁnite n-stage game,
provided that n is suﬃciently large. This can be seen by the construction itself
(Prop. 29) or by applying a general observation made by [34, Prop. 2.13].
3 Sketch of the Proof
In this section we provide the main ideas of the proof. Let G be a stopping
game. To simplify the presentation, assume that Fn is trivial for every n,
so that the payoﬀ process is deterministic, and that payoﬀs are uniformly
bounded by 1. For every two natural numbers k < l, deﬁne the periodic game
G(k, l) to be the game that starts at stage k and, if not stopped earlier, restarts
at stage l. Formally, the terminal payoﬀ at stage n in G(k, l) is equal to the
terminal payoﬀ at stage k + (nmod l − k) in G.
This periodic game is equivalent to an absorbing game, where each round of
T stages corresponds to a single stage of the absorbing game. 14 Moreover, it
has two special properties: It is recursive (payoﬀ in the non-absorbing state
is 0), and there is a unique action proﬁle with a 0 absorbing probability.
Solan and Vohra ([36, Prop. 4.10]) proved a classiﬁcation result for absorbing
14Recall that an absorbing game is a stochastic game with a single non-absorbing
state.
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games. Applying it to the two special properties yields that G(k, l) has one of
the following: (1) A stationary absorbing equilibrium. (2) A stationary non-
absorbing equilibrium. (3) A correlated distribution η over the set of action
proﬁles in which a single player stops. This distribution has special properties
that allow to construct a correlated -equilibrium.
Assign to each pair of non-negative integers k < l an element from a ﬁnite
set of colors c(k, l); the color is a couple where the ﬁrst element, which is 1,
2 or 3, denotes which case of the classiﬁcation result holds in G(k, l), and the
second element is a vector in a dense subset of [−1, 1]n that approximates
the equilibrium payoﬀ in G(k, l). A consequence of Ramsey's theorem ([28])
is that there is an increasing sequence of integers 0 ≤ k1 < k2 < ... such that
c(k1, k2) = c(kj, kj+1) for every j.
Assume ﬁrst that k1 = 0. A perfect correlated 3-equilibrium is constructed
as follows. The construction depends on the case indicated by c(k1, k2). If
the case is 1, then between stages kj and kj+1 the players follow a periodic
equilibrium in the game G(kj, kj+1) with a payoﬀ in an -neighborhood of the
payoﬀ indicated by c(k1, k2). For this concatenated strategy to be a perfect 3-
equilibrium in G, it is needed to verify that: (1) The equilibrium in each G(k, l)
is -perfect. (2) The game is absorbed with probability 1. This is done by giving
appropriate lower bounds to the stopping probability of each G(kj, kj+1) in the
ﬁrst round. If the case indicated by c(k1, k2) is 2, then always continuing is an
equilibrium. If the case indicated by c(k1, k2) is 3, then we adapt the procedure
presented by Solan and Vohra for the construction of a correlated -equilibrium
in a quitting game ([35, Section 4.2]). The adaptation is required to allow the
construction of a perfect (δ, )-equilibrium, despite the use of punishments in
the procedure.
If k1 > 0, then Between stages 0 and k1, the players follow an equilibrium in
the k1-stage game with the terminal payoﬀ that is induced by c(k1, k2). From
stage k1 and on, the players follow the strategy described above. It is easy to
verify that this strategy proﬁle forms a 3-equilibrium.
When the payoﬀ process is general, a periodic game is deﬁned now by two
stopping times µ1 < µ2: µ1 indicates the initial stage and µ2 indicates when
the game restarts. We analyze this kind of periodic games, by adapting the
methods presented in [32] for two-player stopping games, and by using their
stochastic version of Ramsey's theorem.
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4 Preliminaries
The deﬁnitions imply that for every two payoﬀ processes R and R˜ such that
E
(
supn≥0
∥∥∥Rn − R˜n∥∥∥∞) < , every perfect correlated (δ, )-equilibrium in the
stopping game G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) is a (δ, 3)-equilibrium in the stopping
game G˜ =
(
I,Ω,A, p,F , R˜
)
. Hence we can assume w.l.o.g. that the payoﬀ
processR is uniformly bounded and that its range is ﬁnite. Actually, we assume
that for some K ∈ N, RiS,n ∈
{
0,± 1
K
,± 2
K
, ...,±K
K
}
for every n ∈ N. Let
D =
∏
i∈I, ∅6=S⊆I
{
0,± 1
K
,± 2
K
, ...,±K
K
}
be the set of all possible one-stage payoﬀ
matrices of the stopping game G. Let Rn(ω) be the payoﬀ matrix at stage n.
Given any payoﬀ matrix d ∈ D, let Ad ⊆ ∨n∈NFn be the event that d occurs
inﬁnitely often: Ad = {ω ∈ Ω|i.o. Rn(ω) = d}, and let Bd,k ⊆ ∨n∈NFn be the
event that d never occurs after stage k : Bd,k = {ω ∈ Ω|∀n ≥ k, Rn(ω) 6= d}.
Since all Ad and Bd,k are in
∨Fn
n∈N
, there exist N0 ∈ N and sets
(
A¯d, B¯d
)
d∈D ∈
FN0 such that: (1) For each d ∈ D: A¯d
⋂
B¯d = ∅ and
(
A¯d
⋃
B¯d
)
= Ω. (2)
∀d ∈ D, p
(
Ad|A¯d
)
≥ 1− δ
3·|D| . (3) ∀d ∈ D, p
(
Bd,N0|B¯d
)
≥ 1− δ
3·|D| .
Let E =
⋃
d∈D
({
ω ∈ A¯d|ω /∈ Ad
}⋃{
ω ∈ B¯d|ω /∈ Bd,N0
})
. Observe that p(E) <
δ
3
. For any F ∈ F letDF =
{
d ∈ D|F ∈ A¯d
}
, and let αiF = max
(
di{i}|d ∈ DF
)
.
That is DF is the sets of payoﬀ matrices that repeat inﬁnitely often in F , and
αiF is the maximal payoﬀ a player can get by stopping alone in these matrices.
The following standard lemma shows that it is enough to show that every
induced game G (Hn,D) deep enough in the tree (n > N0) has an approximate
constant-expectation perfect correlated equilibrium.
Lemma 16 Let G be a stopping game, δ,  > 0, D = (M,µ) a correlation
device, M ′ ⊆ M a set of signals such that µ(M ′) > 1 − δ, τ a bounded
stopping time, and E ⊆ Ω an event such that p(E) > 1− δ. Assume that for
every ω ∈ Ω and for every H = Hτ(ω) ∈ Hτ(ω), there is a constant-expectation
perfect (δ, )-equilibrium xH of G(H,D) conditioned on E and givenM ′. Then
G (D) admits a constant-expectation perfect (2δ, 2)-equilibrium.
PROOF. It is well known that any ﬁnite-stage game admits a 0-equilibrium
(see, e.g., [29, Prop. 3.1]). Since τ is bounded, p(E) ≥ 1−δ and µ(M ′) ≥ 1−δ,
the following strategy proﬁle x is a (2δ, 2)-equilibrium in G(D):
• Until stage τ , play an equilibrium in the game that terminates at τ , if no
player stops before that stage, with a terminal payoﬀ γi(xH).
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• If the game has not terminated by stage τ , play from that stage on the
proﬁle xH in G(H,D).
5 stopping Games on Finite trees
An important building block in our analysis is stopping games that are played
on ﬁnite trees. In this section we deﬁne these games. discuss their equivalence
with absorbing games, and study some of their properties.
5.1 Finite trees
Deﬁnition 17 A stopping game on a ﬁnite tree (or simply a game on a tree)
is a tuple T =
(
I, V, Vleaf , r, Vstop, (Cv, pv, Rv)v∈V \Vleaf
)
, where:
• I is a ﬁnite non-empty set of players.
•
(
V, Vleaf , r, (Cv)v∈V \Vleaf
)
is a tree, V is a nonempty ﬁnite set of nodes,
Vleaf ⊆ V is a nonempty set of leaves, r ∈ V is the root, and for each
v ∈ V \Vleaf , Cv ⊆ V \ {r} is the nonempty set of children of v. We denote
by V0 = V \Vleaf the set of nodes which are not leaves.
• Vstop ⊆ V0 is the set of nodes the players can choose to stop in. Observe
that players can not stop at the leaves.
and for every v ∈ V0:
• pv is a probability distribution over CV ; We assume that ∀v˜ ∈ Cv: pv(v˜) > 0.
• Rv =
(
Riv,S
)
i∈I,∅6=S⊆I ∈ D is the payoﬀ matrix at v if a nonempty coalition
S stops at that node.
A stopping game on a ﬁnite tree starts at the root and is played in stages.
Given the current node v ∈ Vstop, and the sequence of nodes already visited,
the players decide, simultaneously and independently, whether to stop or to
continue. Let S be the set of players that decide to stop. If S 6= ∅, the play
terminates and the terminal payoﬀ to each player i is Riv,S. If S = ∅, a new
node v ∈ CV is chosen according to ps. The process now repeats itself, with v
being the current node. If v ∈ V \Vstop then the players can not stop at that
stage, and a new node v ∈ CV is chosen according to pv. If v ∈ Vleaf then
the new current node is the root r. A game on a tree is essentially played in
rounds, where each round starts at the root and ends once it reaches a leaf.
A stationary strategy of player i is a function xi : VStop → [0, 1]; xi(v) is
the probability that player 1 stops at v. Let ci be the strategy of player i that
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never stops, and let c = (ci)i∈I . Given a stationary strategy proﬁle x = (x
i)i∈I ,
let γiT (x) = γ
i(x) be the expected payoﬀ under x, and let piT (x) = pi(x)
the probability that the game is stopped at the ﬁrst round (before reaching
a leaf). A proﬁle of stationary strategies x = (xi)i∈I is an -equilibrium of
the game on a tree T if, for each player i ∈ I, and for each strategy yi,
γi (x) > γi (x−i, yi)− .
Assuming no player ever stops, the collection (pv)v∈V0 of probability distri-
butions at the nodes induces a probability distribution over the set of leaves
or, equivalently, over the set of branches that connect the root to the leaves.
For each set Vˆ ⊆ V0, we denote by pVˆ the probability that the chosen branch
passes through Vˆ . For each v ∈ V , we denote by Fv the event that the chosen
branch passes through v.
5.2 Representative Finite Approximations
In the following subsections we are going to use ﬁnite games on trees to rep-
resent periodic stopping games. Since the state space Ω is arbitrary, while
games on trees only represent games with a ﬁnite state space, we need to
approximate F by representative ﬁnite partitions. This can be done by using
the method presented in Shmaya and Solan ([32, Sect. 6]). For each number
n ≥ 0 and bounded stopping time σ we deﬁne a representative ﬁnite partition
Gn,σ of Ω such that: (1) Gn,σ reﬁnes Gk,τ whenever k ≤ n and τ ≤ σ. (2) Gn,σ
is Fn-measurable. (3) Gn,σ contains all the information relevant to the players
until σ is reached. Given k ≥ 0, ω ∈ Ω, and τ ≥ k, let Fk,τ (ω) be the element
of Gk,τ that includes ω.
Let n < σ be a bounded stopping time, and F ∈ Gn,σ. We deﬁne the game
on a tree Tn,σ(F ) as follows: The game begins at stage n, when the state
ω ∈ F ⊆ Gn,σ is randomly chosen (according to p|F ). If the game has not
absorbed before reaching stage τ(n), the game restarts at stage n again (and
a new ω ∈ F ⊆ Gn,σ is randomly chosen). Players are only allowed to stop in
nodes where the matrix payoﬀ is in DF (repeats inﬁnitely often in the inﬁnite
stopping game). Formally:
Deﬁnition 18 Let G = (I,Ω,A, p,F , R) be a stopping game , n ≥ 0 a num-
ber, n < τ a bounded stopping time, (Gk ,τ )τ≥k≥n representative ﬁnite approx-
imating partitions of F , and F ∈ Gn,τ . The game on the ﬁnite tree Tn,τ (F ) is(
I, V, Vleaf , r, Vstop, (Cv, pv, Rv)v∈V \Vleaf
)
where:
• V = ⋃ ω∈F
n≤k≤τ(ω)
{Fk,τ (ω)}, Vleaf = ⋃
ω∈F
{
Fτ(ω),τ (ω)
}
, r = F , Vstop = {v ∈ V |dv ∈ DF}
• Rv, Cv, pv are deﬁned by induction. Assume that v ∈ V \Vleaf and v ∈ Gk,τ
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for some n ≤ k, then: Rv = Rn(v), Cv = {Fk+1,τ ∈ Gk+1,τ |Fk+1,τ ⊆ v}, and
pv(Fk+1,τ ) = p (Fk+1,τ |v).
5.3 Equivalence with Absorbing Games
A stopping game on a ﬁnite tree T is equivalent to an absorbing game, where
each round of T corresponds to a single stage of the absorbing game (a stochas-
tic game with a single non-absorbing state). As an absorbing game, the game
T has two special properties: (1) It is a recursive game: the payoﬀ in the non-
absorbing state is zero; (2) There is a unique non-absorbing action proﬁle.
Adapting [36]'s Prop. 4.10 to the two special properties gives the following:
Deﬁnition 19 Let T be a game on a tree, and i ∈ I a player. gi = maxv∈Vstop(
Rii,v
)
is the maximal payoﬀ a player can get in T by stopping alone. Let v˜i
be a node that maximizes the last expression, and let dv˜i ∈ D be the payoﬀ
matrix in that stage. 15
Proposition 20 Let T be a game on a ﬁnite tree. T has one of the following:
(1) A stationary absorbing equilibrium x 6= c.
(2) For each player i ∈ I and for each node v ∈ Vstop, : Rii,v ≤ 0. This implies
that c is a perfect stationary equilibrium.
(3) There is a distribution η ∈ ∆(I × {v˜i}) such that:
(a)
∑
i∈I Pη(v˜i, i) = 1.
(b) For each player j ∈ I : ∑i∈I Pη(v˜i, i) ·Rj{i},v˜i ≥ gj.
(c) Let the players i ∈ I that satisfy Pη(v˜i, i) > 0 be denoted as the
stopping players. For every stopping player i ∈ I there exists a player
ji 6= i, the punisher of i, such that: gi ≥ Ri{ji},v˜ji .
When we want to emphasize the dependency of these variables on the game
T, we write giT , v˜
i
T , ηT , xT . The equilibrium in case 1 may not be perfect, as
players may use non-credible threats after of-equilibrium path. The following
lemma asserts that a perfect -equilibrium exists in case 1.
Lemma 21 In case 1 of prop. 20, T admits a stationary absorbing perfect
-equilibrium x 6= c.
15Originally part 3 of Prop. 20 requires that every player would have a unique
pure action that maximizes his payoﬀ, conditioned on that the other players always
continue. This can be achieved by small perturbations on the payoﬀs (o ()), such
that Ri
i,v˜i
is strictly larger than any other payoﬀ Rii,v where v ∈ Vstop.
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PROOF. Let T be a perturbed version of the game on a tree T : In T when a
non-empty coalition wishes to stop at some node, there is a probability 2 that
the stopping request is ignored, and the game continues to the next stage.
In T under any proﬁle x, any node is reached with a positive probability, thus
non-credible threats cannot be used in a stationary equilibrium. If case 1 of
prop. 20 applies, then T admits a perfect stationary equilibrium x, and x is
a perfect stationary absorbing -equilibrium in T.
5.4 Limits on Per-Round Probability of Termination
In this subsection we bound the probability of termination in a single round
when a stationary equilibrium x 6= c exists (case 1 of Prop. 20), by adapting to
the multi-player case the methods presented in [32, Subsec. 5.2] for two players.
We ﬁrst bound the probability of termination in a single round when the -
equilibrium payoﬀ is low for at least one player. The lemma is an adaptation
of Lemma 5.3 in [32], and the proof is omitted as the changes are minor.
Lemma 22 Let G be a stopping game, n > 0 a number, σ > n a bounded
stopping time, F ∈ Gn,σ, and  > 0. Let x 6= c be a stationary 2-equilibrium in
Tn,σ(F ) such that there exists a player i ∈ I with a low payoﬀ: γi(x) ≤ αiF − .
Then pi(ci, x−i) ≥ 
6
· qi, where qi = qiT = p
(⋃
v∈Vstop
{
Fv|Ri{i},v = αiF
})
is the
probability that if all the players never stop, the game visits a node v ∈ Vstop
with Ri{i},v = α
i
F in the ﬁrst round.
We now deﬁne a subgame of a game on a tree.
Deﬁnition 23 Let T =
(
I, V, Vleaf , r, Vstop, (Cv, pv, Rv)v∈V0
)
and let T ′ =(
I , V ′, V ′leaf , r
′, V ′stop, (C
′
v, p
′
v, R
′
v)v∈V ′0
)
be two games on trees. We say that T ′
is a subgame of T if: V ′ ⊆ V , V ′stop = Vstop
⋂
V ′, r′ = r, and for every v ∈ V ′0 ,
C ′v = Cv, p
′
v = pv and R
′
v = Rv.
In words, T ′ is a subgame of T if we remove all the descendants (in the
strict sense) of several nodes from the tree
(
V, Vleaf , r, (Cv)v∈V0
)
and keep all
other parameters ﬁxed. Observe that this notion is diﬀerent from the standard
deﬁnition of a subgame in game theory.
Let T be a game on a tree. For each subset D ⊆ V0, we denote by TD the sub-
game of T generated by trimming T from D downward. Thus, all descendants
of nodes in D are removed. For every subgame T ′ of T and every subgame
T ′′ of T ′, let pT ′′,T ′ = pV ′′
leaf
,V ′
leaf
be the probability that the chosen branch in
T passes through a leaf of T ′′ strictly before it passes through a leaf of T ′.
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The following deﬁnition divides the elements of Gn,τ into two kinds: simple and
complicated. This division will be used in the following sections. The simple
sets have at least one of the following properties: (1) There is a player that
receives a negative payoﬀ whenever he stops alone. (2) There is a distribution
over the set of action proﬁles in which a single player stops. Moreover, each
player receives payoﬀ αFi when he stops, and approximately this is also his
average payoﬀ when another player stops.
Deﬁnition 24 Let G be a stopping game,  > 0, and N0 ≤ n a number, and
τ > n a bounded stopping time. The set F ∈ Gn,τ is -simple if one of the
following holds:
(1) For every i ∈ I: αiF < 0. or
(2) There is a distribution θ ∈ ∆(DF × I) such that for each player i ∈ I:
(a) θ(d, i) > 0⇒ Ri{i},d = αiF . and
(b) αiF +  ≥
∑
j∈I, d∈DF
θ(d, j) ·Ri{j},d ≥ αiF − .
F is simple if it is -simple for every  > 0. F is complicated if it is not simple,
i.e.: there is an 0 > 0 such that F is not 0-simple. In that case we say that
F is complicated w.r.t. 0.
The next proposition analyzes stationary −equilibria that yield high payoﬀs
to all the players. The proposition is an adaptation of Prop. 5.5 in [32, Sec.
8]. The proof is omitted as the changes compared with [32] are minor.
Proposition 25 Let G be a stopping game, N0 ≤ n a number, σ > n a
bounded stopping time, F ∈ Gn,σ a complicated set (w.r.t. 0),  << 0|I|·|D| ,
and for each i ∈ I let ai ≥ αiF − . Then there exists a set U ⊆ V0 of nodes
and a strategy proﬁle x in T = Tn,σ(F ) such that:
(1) No subgame of TU has an -equilibrium with a corresponding payoﬀ in∏
i∈I
[ai, ai + ]
(2) Either: (a) U = ∅ (so that TU = T ) or (b) x is a 9-equilibrium in T,
and for every i ∈ I and for every strategy yi: ai−  ≤ γi(x), γi(x−i, yi) ≤
ai + 8, and pi(x) ≥ 2 · pTU ,T .
6 The Use of Ramsey Theorem
In this section we use a stochastic variation of Ramsey theorem ([28,32]), to
disassemble an inﬁnite stopping game into games on ﬁnite trees with special
properties. We begin by deﬁning an F -consistent C-valued NT-function.
Deﬁnition 26 An NT -function is a function that assigns to every integer
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n > 0 and every bounded stopping time τ an Fn-measurable r.v. that is
deﬁned over the set {τ > n}. We say that an NT -function f is C -valued,
for some ﬁnite set C, if the r.v. fn,τ is C -valued, for every n > 0 and every
bounded stopping time τ .
Deﬁnition 27 An NT -function f is F-consistent if for every n > 0, every
Fn-measurable set F, and every two stopping times τ1, τ2, we have: τ1 = τ2 > n
on F implies fn,σ1 = fn,σ2 on F.
Where A holds on B (A,B ∈ F) iﬀ p(Ac⋂B) = 0. When f is an NT -function,
and τ1 < τ2 are two bounded stopping times we denote fτ1,τ2(ω) = fτ1(ω),τ2(ω).
Thus fτ1,τ2 is an Fn-measurable random variable. Shmaya and Solan proved
the following proposition ([32, Theorem 4.3]):
Proposition 28 For every ﬁnite set C, every C -valued F-consistent NT -
function f, and every  > 0, there exists an increasing sequence of bounded
stopping times 0 < σ1 < σ2 < σ3 < ... such that: p (fσ1,σ2 = fσ2,σ3 = ...) > 1−.
In the rest of this section we provide an algorithm that attaches a color cn,σ(F )
and several numbers (λj,n,σ(F ))j for every σ > n ≥ 0 and F ∈ Gn,σ, such that
cn,σ(F ) is a C -valued F-consistent NT -function.
A (hyper)-rectangle ([ai, ai + ])i∈I is bad if for every i ∈ I, αiF −  ≤ ai. It is
good if there exists a player i ∈ I such that ai +  ≤ αiF − . Let W be a ﬁnite
covering of [−1, 1]|I| with (not necessarily disjoint) rectangles ([ai, ai + ])i∈I ,
all of which are either good or bad. Let B = {b1, b2, ..., bJ} be the set of bad
rectangles in W and let O = {o1, o2, ..., oK} the set of good rectangles.
Set C = (simple
⋃
allbad
⋃ {1×O}⋃ {2}⋃ {3×W ×W}). Let G be a stop-
ping game, n ≥ 0, σ > n a bounded stopping time, and F ∈ Gn,σ. If
F is simple we let cn,σ(F ) = simple. Otherwise, F is complicated w.r.t.
to some 0(F ). In that case we assume that from now we ﬁx ε such that
0 <  << minF∈FˆN0
0(F )
|I|·|D| . The color cn,σ(F ) is determined as follows:
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• Set T (0) = Tn,σ(F ).
• For 1 ≤ j ≤ J apply Prop. 20 to T (j−1) and the bad rectangle hj =∏
i∈I
[
aij, a
i
j + 
]
to obtain a subgame T (j) of T (j−1) and strategy proﬁle xj
in T (j) such that:
(1) No subgame of T (j) has a stationary -equilibrium with a corresponding
payoﬀ in hj.
(2) Either T (j) = T (j−1) or the following three conditions hold:
(a) For every i ∈ I, aij −  ≤ γi(xj).
(b) For every i ∈ I and every strategy yi: γi(x−ij , yi) ≤ aij + 8.
16 The procedure is an adaptation of the 2-player procedure described in [32, Sec. 5]
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(c) pi (xj) ≥ 2 × pT (j),T (j−1) .
• If T (J) is trivial (the only node is the root), set cn,σ(F ) = allbad; otherwise
due to Prop. 20 and our procedure one of the following holds:
(1) T (J) has a perfect stationary absorbing -equilibrium x, with a payoﬀ γ(x)
in one of the good hyper-rectangles. Let cn,σ(F ) = (1, ol), where ol is the
good rectangle that includes γx .
(2) T (J) has a perfect stationary non-absorbing equilibrium c, with a payoﬀ
0. Let cn,σ(F ) = (2).
(3) There is a correlated strategy proﬁle η ∈ ∆(A) in T (J) that satisﬁes
3(a)+3(b)+3(c) in Prop. 20. Let cn,σ(F ) = (3, w1, w2) where w1 is the
hyper-rectangle that includes γT (J)(η), and w2 is the hyper-rectangle that
includes g(T (J)).
Each strategy proﬁle xj, as given by Prop. 20, is a proﬁle in T
(j−1). We consider
is as a proﬁle in T by letting it continue from the leaves of T (j−1) downward.
We deﬁne, for every j ∈ J , λj,n,σ(F ) = pT (j),T (j−1) .
By Prop. 28 there exists an increasing sequence of bounded stopping times
0 < σ1 < σ2 < σ3 < ... such that: p (cσ1,σ2 = cσ2,σ3 = ...) > 1 − δ3 . For every
F ∈ Gσ1,σ2, , let cF = cσ1,σ2(F ).
Let (A,j, A∞,j)j∈J ∈
∨
n=1..∞
Fn be:A∞,j =
{
w ∈ Ω| ∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1
(
Fσk(ω)
)
=∞
}
,
A,j =
{
w ∈ Ω| ∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1
(
Fσk(ω)
)
≤ |J |
}
. As (A,j, A∞,j)j∈J ∈
∨
n=1..∞
Fn,
there is large enough N1 ≥ N0 and sets
(
A¯,j, A¯∞,j
)
j∈J ∈ FN1 such that: (1)
For each j ∈ J :A¯,j ⋂ A¯∞,j = ∅ and(A¯,j ⋃ A¯∞,j) = Ω. (2) p (A,j|A¯,j) ≥
1− δ
6·|J | . (3) p
(
A∞,j|A¯∞,j
)
≥ 1− δ
6·|J | . From now on, we assume w.l.o.g. that
σ1 ≥ N1. Let E ′ be deﬁned as follows (Observe that p(E ′) ≥ 1− δ):
Ω\E ′=E ⋃
j∈J
{
ω ∈ A¯,j|
∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1
(
Fσk(ω)
)
>

|J |
}
⋃
j∈J
{
ω ∈ A¯∞,j|
∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1
(
Fσk(ω)
)
<∞
}
⋃{
ω ∈ Ω|∃n s.t. cσn,σn+1 (ω) 6= c1,2 (ω)
}
7 Approximate Constant-Expectation Perfect Correlated Equilib-
rium
We ﬁnish the proof of the main theorem by the following proposition:
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Proposition 29 Let G be a stopping game, δ,  > 0, E ′ ⊆ Ω, σ1 and σ2 be
deﬁned as in the previous subsection, and F ∈ Gσ1,σ2. Then there is a universal
correlation device D = (M,µ) and a strategy proﬁle xF in the game G(F,D),
such that xF is a perfect (δ, )-constant-expectation -equilibrium in the game
G(F,D) conditioned on E ′ and given M ′, where µ (M ′) > 1− δ.
PROOF. The proof is divided to a few cases according to the color of cF and
whether F ∈ A¯∞,j. The ﬁrst 3 cases adapt the methods of [32, Sec.7].
7.1 There exists j ∈ J such that F ∈ A¯∞,j
Let 1 ≤ j ≤ J be the smallest index such that F ∈ A¯∞,j. Let xj,σk,σk+1 be the
jth proﬁle in the procedure described in Section 6, when applied to Tσk,σk+1 .
Let xF be the following strategy proﬁle in G (F,D): between σk and σk+1 play
according to xj,σk,σk+1 . The procedure of Section 6 implies the following:
• Conditioned on that the game was absorbed between σk and σk+1 the proﬁle
xj,σk,σk+1 gives each player a payoﬀ: a
i
j −  ≤ γiσk,σk+1(xj) ≤ aij + 8.
• For each player i ∈ I and for each strategy yi in Tσk,σk+1 : (1) γiσk,σk+1(x−ij , yi) ≤
aij + 8. (2) piσk,σk+1(xj) ≥ 2 × λj(Tσk,σk+1)
Those facts that outside E ′ the game is absorbed with probability 1, and that
xF is a 11-equilibrium conditioned on Ω\E ′ . Observe that cF = allbed implies
that there exists j ∈ J such that F ∈ A¯∞,j.
7.2 F ∈ ⋂
j∈J
A¯,j and cF = 2
Let xF be the proﬁle in which everyone continues. It is implied that no player
can proﬁt more than  by deviating at any stage, conditioned on E ′.
7.3 F ∈ ⋂
j∈J
A¯,j and cF = (1, ok) ∈ (1×O)
Let xσk,σk+1 be a stationary absorbing equilibrium in T
(J) with a payoﬀ γσk,σk+1
in the good hyper-rectangle ow:
∏
i∈I [aiw, a
i
w + ]. As ow is good, there is a
player i ∈ I such that: aiw ≤ αiF − 2. Let xF be the following strategy proﬁle
in GF : between σk and σk+1 play according to xσk,σk+1 . Lemma 22 implies
that pi(ci, x−iσk,σk+1) ≥ 6 · qiσk,σk+1 , where qiσk,σk+1 = p(∃σk ≤ n < σk+1, Rii,n =
20
αiF , R
i
i,n ∈ DF ). On E ′, Rii,n = αiF inﬁnitely often and
∑
j=1..J
∑
k=1..∞
λj,σk,σk+1 < .
This implies that under xF the game is absorbed with probability 1, and that
xF is a 4-equilibrium in G, conditioned on E
′.
7.4 F ∈ ⋂
j∈J
A¯,j and cF = (1, w1, w2) ∈ (1×W ×W )
The construction in this case is as an adaptation of the procedure of [35],
which deals with quitting games (stationary stopping games where payoﬀ is
the same at all stages). Let η = ησ1,σ2 be a correlated strategy proﬁle in Tσ1,σ2
that satisﬁes 3(a), 3(b) and 3(c) in Prop. 20. The deﬁnition of αiF implies that
αiF = g
i(Tσ1,σ2) ∈ wi2. This implies that there is a distribution θ = θ(η) ∈
∆(DF × I) such that for each player i ∈ I:
(1) θ(d, i) > 0 ⇒ Rii,d = αiF , ∀d′ 6= d ∈ DF , θ(d′, i) = 0. Let d(i) ∈ DF be
the payoﬀ satisfying θ(di, i) > 0. If no such payoﬀ exists, let d(i) = ∅.
(2)
∑
j∈I, d∈DF θ(d, j) ·Ri{j},d ≥ αiF
(3) If there is d ∈ DF such that θ(d, i) > 0, then there exists a punisher
ji ∈ I such that: d(ji) 6= ∅ and d(ji)iji ≤ αiF .
Let ζ ∈ ∆(I) be: ζ(i) = η(d(i), i). Let (τ ik)i∈I.k=1..∞ be an increasing sequence
of stopping times deﬁned by induction: τ i01 is the ﬁrst stage n such that Rn =
d(i0). τ
i0
n+1 is the ﬁrst stage m > max
i∈I
(τ in) such that Rm = d(i0). Observe that
in E ′ each τ in <∞. We now describe the correlation deviceDDF = (MDF , µDF ).
Let M iDF = {1, ..., Tˆ +T + 1}, where T ∈ N is suﬃciently large, and Tˆ >> T .
Let µDF be as follows:
(1) A number lˆ is chosen uniformly over
{
1, ..., Tˆ
}
.
(2) The quitter i ∈ I is chosen according to ζ. Player i receives signal lˆ.
(3) A number l is chosen uniformly over
{
lˆ + 1, ˆ..., l + T
}
(4) Player ji, the punisher of player i, receives the signal l.
(5) Each other player i˜ 6= i, j receives the signal l + 1.
Let M δ,DF ⊆ MDF be the signal proﬁles in which some of the players receive
an extreme signal: relative close to 1 or to Tˆ +T . If T, Tˆ are large enough, we
can assume that µ(Mδ,DF ) ≤ δ2D . Deﬁne now the following strategy xiF for each
player i ∈ I: let mi be the signal of player i. Player i stops at stages τn that
satisfy: n = (mi) mod Tˆ + T + 1,
17 and continues in all other stages. Let the
universal correlation device D = (M,µ) be the Cartesian multiplication: D =
17On equilibrium path the player stops at stage τn. The requirement to stop at later
stages where n = (mi) mod Tˆ+T+1 is needed to satisfy the perfection requirement.
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∏
DF⊆DDDF . Similarly let M ′ = M\
∏
DF⊆DM δ,DF . Observe that µ (M
′) ≥
1− δ.
If the players follow the strategy proﬁle xF then the game is absorbed with
probability 1 conditioned on E ′ and the expected payoﬀ satisﬁes αiF ≤ γiF (x) ∈
wi1 . Moreover, if Tˆ >> T , then immediately after receiving his signal mi
(assuming m ∈ M ′) no player can infer from his signal whether or not he is
the quitter, thus xF is (δ, )-constant-expectation.
We now verify that if T, Tˆ are suﬃciently large, no player can gain too much by
deviating at any stage of the game conditioned on that ω ∈ E ′ and given m ∈
M ′. First, the probability the quitter i ∈ I correctly guesses the punishment
stage is very low, and thus he cannot proﬁt too much by deviating. Similarly,
any other player (j 6= i ∈ I) has a low probability to correctly guess τ i
lˆ
, the
stage the quitter stops . Moreover, if T is suﬃciently large, then, with high
probability, player j does not know when he recieves his signal whether he is
the quitter, punisher or a regular player, and he cannot infer which of the
other players is more likely to be the quitter. Therefore, player j can not earn
much by stopping before stage lˆ. Observe that when the quitter deviates and
does not stop. his punisher, say player i, does not know that he is a punisher.
When player j has to stop, he believes that he is the quitter (assuming m ∈
M ′). This implies that the players -best-respond at all stages including while
(unknowingly) punishing, and that xF is a perfect -equilibrium in G(F,D)
conditioned on ω ∈ E ′ and given m ∈M ′.
7.5 cF = simple
If for every i ∈ I: αiF ≤ 0, then the proﬁle in which all the players always
continue is an equilibrium in E ′. Otherwise, the fact that cF = simple implies
that there is a distribution θ ∈ ∆(DF × I) such that for each i ∈ I: (1)
θ(d, i) > 0 ⇒ Ri{i},d = αiF . (2) αiF +  ≥
∑
j∈I, d∈DF
θ(d, j) · Ri{j},d ≥ αiF − . In
this case, one can use a procedure similar to the one described in the previous
subsection, to construct a perfect -equilibrium in G(F,D) conditioned on
ω ∈ E ′ and given m ∈M ′.
8 Generalized Stopping Games
In the previous sections we only dealt with simple stopping games, which end
as soon as any player stops. In this section we show how to extend our result
to more generalized stopping games, where the game terminates only after all
the players stopped.
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A generalized stopping games is played as follows. There is an unknown state
variable, on which players receive symmetric partial information along the
game. At stage 1 all the players are active. At every stage n, each active player
declares, independently of the others, whether he stops or continues. A player
that stops at stage n, becomes passive for the rest of the game. The payoﬀ of
a player depends on the history of actions while he has been active and on the
state variable. Theorem 14 shows that every simple stopping game admits a
perfect normal-form constant-expectation correlated approximate equilibrium
with a canonical and universal correlation device. For brevity, we will relate
to such an equilibrium in the rest of this section as a good approximate
equilibrium. We now sketch the outline of the proof that every generalized
stopping game admits a good approximate equilibrium.
Assume by induction that any m-player stopping game admits a good ap-
proximate equilibrium. Given a generalized stopping game G′ with m + 1
players, we construct an auxiliary simple stopping game G with the following
payoﬀ process:
• When i ∈ S: RiS,n is equal to the payoﬀ of player i in the generalized game
G′ when coalition S stops at stage n, while no other player stopped before.
• When i /∈ S: RiS,n is the payoﬀ of player i in a good approximate equi-
librium of the induced generalized m + 1 − |S|player stopping game that
begins at stage n+ 1 with the players I\S. Such an equilibrium exists due
to the induction hypothesis.
Due to Theorem 14, the simple game G admits a good approximate equi-
librium x. x induces a good approximate equilibrium x′ in the generalized
game G′ in a natural way:
• The players follow x as long as all the players continue.
• As soon as some of the players stop, the remaining active players play the
good approximate equilibrium of the induced generalized stopping game
with fewer players.
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